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Cognition is organized in a structured series of attentional episodes, allowing complex problems to be
addressed through solution of simpler subproblems. A ‘‘multiple-demand’’ (MD) system of frontal and
parietal cortex is active in many different kinds of tasks, and using data from neuroimaging, electrophysi-
ology, neuropsychology, and cognitive studies of intelligence, I propose a core role for MD regions in assem-
bly of the attentional episode. Monkey and human data show dynamic neural coding of attended information
across multiple MD regions, with rapid communication within and between regions. Neuropsychological and
imaging data link MD function to fluid intelligence, explaining some but not all ‘‘executive’’ deficits after fron-
tal lobe lesions. Cognitive studies link fluid intelligence to goal neglect, and the problem of dividing complex
task requirements into focused parts. Like the innate releasing mechanism of ethology, I suggest that con-
struction of the attentional episode provides a core organizational principle for complex, adaptive cognition.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
Since the information processing revolution of the 1950s, the
spectacular diversity of human behavior has led to increasing
fractionation in accounts of mind and brain, with dedicated
analysis of problems from simple sensorimotor control to story
grammars, human-computer interaction, and expertise in chess.
Such fractionation suggests a need for organizational principles
addressing how cognition in general is constructed and con-
trolled (Newell, 1990). One widely accepted principle is modu-
larity in mind and brain (Kanwisher, 2010), with dedicated
cognitive/brain systems undertaking different kinds of informa-
tion processing. In this paper, I consider an orthogonal organiza-
tion—the construction of all complex cognition from a series of
focused, momentarily assembled temporal fragments.
A useful point of reference is the ethological concept of the
‘‘innate releasing mechanism’’ or IRM (Lorenz, 1970; Tinbergen,
1951). The IRM is conceived asaneural processdelivering a fixed
fragment of behavior when released by a suitable triggering
event—the moth flashing open its wings to reveal staring eye
spots when touched by a predator, the toad orienting to the sight
of a worm, or the human urged to protect an infant by the sight of
large eyes and tall forehead. In much animal behavior, concate-
nation of such behavioral fragments, each controlled by its own
IRM, produces complex, goal-directed sequences or programs
of activity; for example, when two mating sticklebacks, each re-
sponding to theactionsof theother, proceedbyaseriesof stages
into the nest where spawning takes place (Tinbergen, 1951).
In human cognition, too, thought and behavior unfold in a com-
plex, structured sequence, with many component fragments
assembled to achieve short- and long-term goals (Miller et al.,
1960). By comparison with mating sticklebacks, however,
human thought and behavior have essentially infinite flexibility
and complexity. Unlike the IRM, fragments of human cognition
must be momentarily constructed, shaped by the arbitrary
requirements of current activity.The sequential control of complex cognition has been most
fully addressed in symbolic artificial intelligence, with systems
such as the General Problem Solver (Newell et al., 1962), ACT
(Anderson, 1983), and SOAR (Newell, 1990) dividing complex
problems into a long, structured series of more solvable sub-
problems. Inmanyways, the sequential mental control programs
produced by such systems resemble the serial processing of
conventional computers. Artificial intelligence also makes it clear
why it is that complex problems must be decomposed into
simpler components. An example, from the work of Sacerdoti
(1974), is shown in Figure 1 (for closely related arguments in
different theoretical traditions see Botvinick et al., 2009; Snyder
and Munakata, 2010). In this program, a robot inhabited a world
of multiple rooms, some containing other objects. Given a start
state and a goal state (Figure 1A), the robot was required to
find a sequence of moves transforming one into the other. In
Figure 1B are shown two solution paths through the total space
of alternative problem states. In the first (Figure 1B, left), there is
no chunking into subgoals such as ‘‘first reach the door of the
current room.’’ Instead, all possible actions are considered
simultaneously and, though the problem is eventually solved,
this is achieved by a long and chaotic route. The essential diffi-
culty is that, if all aspects of the problem are considered at
once, the search space of possible alternative routes is simply
too large and unconstrained, resulting in many suboptimal
choices. In the second solution (Figure 1B, right), the architecture
tends first to choose a relatively abstract subgoal and then work
within that to elaborate a detailed solution. Now the path to the
goal is orderly and direct, as one organizing subgoal after
another comes into force and controls system function until it
is achieved. In Figure 1B, as Sacerdoti (1974) notes, it is as if
the program is given a series of ‘‘small problems to solve
consecutively’’ (p. 129).
For any realistic behavior, on this analysis, there is a complex
space of possible actions, states, and processing operations.Neuron 80, October 2, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 35
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Figure 1. Shaping Cognition by Division of
Complex Problems into Simpler
Subproblems
(A) Start and goal states for a problem in Sacerdoti
(1974).
(B) Search paths through the space of possible
problem states (nodes) without (left) and with
(right) effective subgoaling. Without subgoaling,
the route from start state (top) to goal state
(bottom) is complex and inefficient, with explora-
tion of many states not included on the final solu-
tion path. Subgoaling creates a series of small
subproblems (indicated by breaks in search path),
each of which can be solved with maximal effi-
ciency. Adapted with permission from Sacerdoti
(1974).
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space, each defining a subproblem of relevant inputs, actions,
and potential achievements. Often these will be organized hier-
archically, so that each subgoal or task part is divided further
into subgoals of its own (Miller et al., 1960; Sacerdoti, 1974).
As selection is the defining characteristic of attention, cognition
may be described as a series of attentional episodes, with each
episode admitting into consideration only the contents of a
momentary, focused subproblem.
A central role in attentional control is frequently given to the
frontal lobes (Norman and Shallice, 1980; Desimone and
Duncan, 1995; Miller and Cohen, 2001). The classic descriptions
of Bianchi (1922), Penfield and Evans (1935), Luria (1966), and
others document the global disorganization of behavior that
can follow frontal lobe damage, often with intact behavioral frag-
ments but no complex, goal-directed structure. In the words of
Bianchi (1922), ‘‘The monkey which used to jump on to the
window-ledge, to call out to his companions, after the operation
jumps on to the ledge again, but does not call out. The sight of
the window determines the reflex of the jump, but the purpose
is now lacking, for it is no longer represented in the focal point
of consciousness...Evidently there are lacking all those other
images that are necessary for the determination of a series of
movements coordinated towards one end’’ (Bianchi, 1922, p.
184). Indeed, classic descriptions of frontal lobe patients are
strongly reminiscent of the two search paths of Figure 1B—
chaotic behavior in complex problems but success if the task
is externally structured into simple parts (Luria and Tsvetkova,
1964). In this paper, I review evidence for a specific, distributed
frontoparietal system whose role, I propose, is to construct the
sequential attentional episodes of complex cognition.36 Neuron 80, October 2, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.The Multiple-Demand System
One of the most robust results of
human functional brain imaging, including
positron emission tomography (PET)
and fMRI, is a strong common core of
brain activity resulting from cognitive
challenges in many different domains—
perception, response selection, langu-
age, many varieties of memory, problem
solving, task novelty, and many more
(Duncan and Owen, 2000; see also
Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000; Cole andSchneider, 2007). Reflecting its ubiquity across many cognitive
domains, I have called this the multiple-demand or MD pattern
(Duncan, 2005, 2010b). Included in the MD pattern are cortex
on the lateral frontal surface, along the middle frontal gyrus and
extending posteriorly into premotor cortex; in the anterior insula
and adjacent frontal operculum; in the dorsomedial frontal cor-
tex, including presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and dor-
sal anterior cingulate; andwithin andsurrounding the intraparietal
sulcus. Accompanying activity is commonly seen in subcortical
regions including basal ganglia, thalamus, and cerebellum. A
similar pattern is seen in the ‘‘task positive’’ or ‘‘control’’ network
commonly defined by analysis of temporal correlations in
resting state data (e.g., Cole and Schneider, 2007; Seeley et al.,
2007; Vincent et al., 2008), sometimes further divided into sub-
networks including ‘‘frontoparietal control,’’ ‘‘dorsal attention,’’
and ‘‘cinguloopercular’’ (e.g., Dosenbach et al., 2007; Power
et al., 2011).
The topography and functional properties of MD activity are
illustrated in Figure 2, based on a recent study from Fedorenko
et al. (2013). The study involved seven different tasks, covering
demands in language, arithmetic, verbal and spatial working
memory, and several varieties of response selection/inhibition.
To examine brain activity associated with increased cognitive
demand in each domain, each task had a harder and an easier
version. Results of conventional random-effects analysis for
each task (Figure 2A) show the usual MD activity pattern associ-
ated with increased difficulty in each separate task. At least in
these visual tasks, extensive demand-related activity is also
seen in higher visual cortex, though here I shall focus just on
the frontoparietal MD regions. Average results across tasks
show a ‘‘canonical’’ MD system (Figure 2B).
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Figure 2. Multiple-Demand System in the Human Brain
(A) Activity pattern for hard minus easy contrast in tasks tapping multiple cognitive domains (top to bottom: remembering word/nonword strings, arithmetic,
spatial working memory, verbal working memory, and three versions of resisting response conflict).
(B) Mean hard minus easy activity pattern across all seven tasks. Generally bilateral activity has been captured by averaging across left and right hemispheres,
and projecting the resulting mean image onto the right. Included in the full multiple-demand (MD) pattern are a posterior strip of the lateral frontal surface, from
premotor cortex to the frontal operculum and anterior insula; an anterior-posterior strip extending along the inferior frontal sulcus; a dorsomedial strip extending
from pre-SMA to the dorsal part of the anterior cingulate; and activity along the length of the intraparietal sulcus. At least in visual tasks, accompanying activity is
generally seen in higher visual areas. Outside the cerebral cortex, activity is also seen in the medial cerebellum and elsewhere.
(C) Left hemisphere activity for two example participants, showing closely adjacent MD (blue; greater activity in memory for nonword strings versus sentences)
and language (red; reverse contrast) regions. Adapted with permission from Fedorenko et al. (2013).
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one task as a localizer for MD voxels in a single subject’s brain,
Fedorenko et al. (2013) went on to ask how these same voxels
behaved in the other six tasks (see also Stiers et al., 2010;
Wojciulik and Kanwisher, 1999). For all major regions shown in
Figure 2B, results were similar; in individual subjects, voxels
with strong response to the localizer also showed increased
activity for other cognitive demands. In individual subjects, tell-
ingly, MD regions were often immediately adjacent to regions
with a very different functional profile, responding to increased
difficulty neither in the localizer nor in other tasks. In left lateral
frontal cortex, for example, a typical MD region often surrounded
a quite different region, showing selective activity for language
(Fedorenko et al., 2012; see Figure 2C). In a control region of
the temporal lobe, equivalent analyses suggested no MD voxels
in single subjects, i.e., no voxels with common response to mul-
tiple cognitive demands. Taken together, these data show tightly
localizedMD activity, varying in exact pattern from one person to
another but with a highly consistent overall topography in frontal
and parietal cortex.To link imaging results to electrophysiology, a critical question
is correspondence between human and animal systems. In the
macaque, one fMRI study comparing pro- and antisaccades
showed activity in lateral frontal, dorsomedial frontal, and parie-
tal cortex, reminiscent of the human MD pattern (Ford et al.,
2009). Somewhat similar patterns have also been obtained by
a simple comparison of visual stimulation versus fixation
(Stoewer et al., 2010) and by analysis of correlations in resting
state data (Sallet et al., 2013; though see Mantini et al., 2013).
In support of these functional data, anatomical studies confirm
connections between lateral frontal, dorsomedial frontal,
parietal, and insular regions (e.g., Cavada and Goldman-Rakic,
1989; Goldman-Rakic, 1988; Mufson and Mesulam, 1982).
Activity crossing multiple task demands suggests functions of
importance in many different kinds of cognition. In the following
sections, I suggest that the core function of the MD system is to
control complex behavior in a series of attentional episodes. In
multiple MD regions, I suggest that neurons have highly dynamic
response properties, adapting to code the specific information
and events within the current attentional focus (Duncan, 2001).Neuron 80, October 2, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 37
Neuron
ReviewWith the transition between one episode and the next, neural
coalitions for one kind of information processing dissolve and
coalitions for the next episode form, producing a system in con-
stant flux. In line with many other ideas of frontal lobe function
(e.g., Norman and Shallice, 1980; Dehaene et al., 1998; Miller
and Cohen, 2001), I suggest that focused MD coding of informa-
tion relevant to a current attentional episode drives linked pro-
cessing in multiple other brain regions, configuring widespread
brain activity for solution of the selected problem. The universal
importance of MD activity, I suggest, provides a core basis for
the psychometric concept of fluid intelligence. I review recent
findings linking fluid intelligence to the neuropsychology of
control or executive disorders following frontal lobe damage
and examine its cognitive basis in decomposing complex prob-
lems into simpler, more focused parts. Beyond psychometrics, I
suggest that problem decomposition of this sort lies at the heart
of abstract thought and rationality, providing infrastructure for
the full complexity and diversity of human cognition (Duncan,
2010a; Zylberberg et al., 2011).
Physiological Properties of the MD System
The role of MD cortex in construction of attentional episodes is
most clearly shown in single-unit data from the awake, behaving
monkey. Many monkey studies have examined single-cell activ-
ity in the posterior part of the lateral frontal cortex, within the
principal sulcus, and on the dorsolateral and ventrolateral
surfaces above and below this sulcus. These studies show a
picture of highly flexible neural properties, dynamically adapting
to code the specific content of a current task episode (Duncan,
2001), with similar results increasingly reported also for regions
of dorsomedial frontal cortex (e.g., Procyk et al., 2000), insula
(e.g., Mizuhiki et al., 2007), and parietal cortex, including
Brodmann’s area 7 on the inferior frontal convexity, perhaps ex-
tending into area LIP of the intraparietal sulcus (e.g., Freedman
and Assad, 2006).
One striking property of prefrontal activity is breadth of infor-
mation coding. Across attentional episodes, many different
kinds of information may be critical to behavior, and in prefrontal
cortex, correspondingly, cells code relevant stimuli, responses,
rewards, rules, working memory contents, etc. (Duncan, 2001;
Miller and Cohen, 2001). Indeed, one critical result is simply
the high frequency of task-related activity found in this cortical
region. Though neurons are randomly sampled, and later tested
for activity related to the events of a particular, arbitrary task,
high proportions of all cells show activity that is linked to task
events. The result has been repeated for a very wide range of
task types—same/different matching (Wallis et al., 2001), visual
target detection (Kusunoki et al., 2010), dot counting (Nieder
et al., 2002), and many more. When the animal monitors a series
of images awaiting a specific target, for example, a recent study
of ours foundmore than 50% of all prefrontal cells discriminating
targets from nontargets (Kusunoki et al., 2010). If an animal clas-
sifies visual images as ‘‘cats’’ or ‘‘dogs,’’ between 20% and 40%
of cells are found to behave as cat-dog categorizers (Freedman
et al., 2001; Roy et al., 2010). In this large area of cortex, large
proportions of cells code the specific information required in a
current epoch of behavior. Similar data come from studies of
rat frontal cortex, with many cells coding behavioral strategy,38 Neuron 80, October 2, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.choice preference, etc., and the population showing rapid shifts
of activity state when strategy or preference changes (e.g.,
Durstewitz et al., 2010; Karlsson et al., 2012).
Such large proportions of apparently ‘‘task-related’’ cells
suggest flexibility, with neural properties shaped by current
task context. Flexibility is a second critical property of attentional
coding; as momentary task context changes, so too does
required information. Correspondingly, information coding in
prefrontal cells changes with momentary task relevance. In cate-
gorization tasks, for example, a cue to change between orthog-
onal categorizations of the same stimulus set alters prefrontal
coding, with selective emphasis of the category boundary rele-
vant on the current trial (Roy et al., 2010). Similar results follow
a switch of attention between different visual features such as
color and shape (Sakagami and Niki, 1994). In working-memory
tasks, cells show sustained activity linked to stimulus identity
when this information is required within the trial but then switch
to coding of location when identity is no longer relevant and
only location guides the final response (Rao et al., 1997).
A third critical property is flexible transition from one step of a
mental program to the next. In the target-monitoring task (Kusu-
noki et al., 2009; Stokes et al., 2013), for example, a cue at trial
onset indicates the target image for the current trial
(Figure 3A). Activity can thus be examined during successive
task stages: during initial cue presentation, during the delay
between cue and choice stimuli, and during classification of
each choice stimulus as target or nontarget. When the cue is pre-
sented, an initial burst of activity includes many cells coding cue
identity (Kusunoki et al., 2009; Stokes et al., 2013). This initial
code, however, is transient; across the cell population, a quite
different pattern of activity is seen during the subsequent delay,
with many cells again coding cue identity, but with cue prefer-
ences unrelated to those of the initial sensory response (Stokes
et al., 2013; Figure 3B). In fact, activity patterns in cue and delay
phases are approximately orthogonal: a cell’s activity during one
phase is essentially unpredictive of behavior at another (Sigala
et al., 2008; for similar evidence from rat frontal cortex, see
Lapish et al., 2008). When choice stimuli appear, a first wave of
activity discriminates one picture from another, irrespective of
behavioral status on the current trial, but within 300 ms, the
activity pattern is dominated by the behaviorally critical distinc-
tion between targets and nontargets (Stokes et al., 2013;
Figure 3C). Again, the same cells that initially discriminate picture
identity may, within a few hundred milliseconds, have switched
to discriminating targets from nontargets. As the successive
steps of the task unfold, activity in the same pool of neurons is
repeatedly reorganized, at each stage coding behaviorally crit-
ical information. Other data confirm how, in different tasks,
similar information can be coded by quite different activity
patterns at different task stages (Hussar and Pasternak, 2012;
Miller et al., 1996; Warden and Miller, 2010; though for contrary
examples see Takeda and Funahashi, 2004; Saga et al., 2011).
It is often proposed that, within and across brain regions, the
components of a cognitive operation may be bound together
by some form of neural synchrony or temporal coherence
(Womelsdorf et al., 2010), and in several regions of frontal cortex,
new neural coalitions—defined by new patterns of connectivity
or coherence—are defined at transitions between task steps
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Figure 3. Dynamic Representation of Task-Critical Information in Monkey Prefrontal Cortex
(A) Three alternative cue pictures (cues 1 to 3) indicated three alternative target pictures (targets 1 to 3) for the current trial. Each trial began with a single cue to left
or right of fixation, followed by a sequence of 0–3 nontargets and finally the cued target. The monkey was rewarded for a saccade to the location of the stimulus
stream at target offset; saccades at other times aborted the trial without reward. Nontargets were a random sequence of neutral stimuli (associated with no cue
and thus never serving as targets) and distractors (associated with other cues, and thus serving as targets on other trials). The cue thus established critical choice
context for the current trial.
(B) Temporal specificity of cue coding. At each time from cue onset (test and train times), discriminative coding for any two cues (e.g., cue 1 versus cue 2) was
measured by the pattern of cue preferences across thewhole recorded cell population. The preference pattern wasmeasured using one half of the data from each
cell (train), then compared to patterns from the other half of the data (test), measured at the same (diagonal) or different (off-diagonal) times. Color scale shows
pattern similarity. In the early period of cue processing, preference patterns were highly time specific; test patterns at one time point were similar to train patterns
from nearby times but unrelated to train patterns from distant times. Late in cue processing and during the following delay period, preference patterns were more
stable, indicated by approximately square region on top right of the pattern similarity plot.
(C) Coding of stimulus- and decision-related information following onset of each choice stimulus (target or nontarget). Red line shows mean coding strength for
discrimination of two pictures, irrespective of status as target or nontarget. Blue line shows coding strength for discrimination of target versus nontarget, irre-
spective of picture identity. Again, coding strength is measured by similarity of preference patterns in train and test data, here for train and test patterns from
identical times (cf. B, diagonal only). Adapted with permission from Stokes et al. (2013).
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Review(Vaadia et al., 1995; Abeles et al., 1995; Lapish et al., 2008).
Coherence can occur within (e.g., Buschman et al., 2012) and
between (e.g., Buschman and Miller, 2007; Salazar et al., 2012)
MD regions, with patterns of coherence sometimes coding the
specific content of current cognition such as a remembered
item or current decision rule (e.g., Buschman et al., 2012; Pipa
and Munk, 2011; Salazar et al., 2012). Based on components
of the local field potential (LFP), relative latency and Granger
causality can be used to examine communication between pairs
of MD regions, e.g., lateral and dorsomedial frontal (Rothe´ et al.,
2011) or lateral frontal and parietal (Salazar et al., 2012). Causal
influence probably occurs in both directions (e.g., Salazar et al.,
2012), with the predominant direction likely varying with cogni-
tive context (Rothe´ et al., 2011), timing within the trial, etc.
Context and timing are also critical in comparing the coding of
task-relevant information betweenMD regions. Information pref-
erentially encoded in one region of frontal cortex early in a trial,
for example, may bemore broadly represented shortly afterward
(e.g., Kusunoki et al., 2010; Kaping et al., 2011), suggesting rapiddistribution of information between frontal regions. While similar
neural properties are often found in lateral and dorsomedial fron-
tal cortex, some findings suggest especially strong dorsomedial
activity when a new problem must be solved (e.g., Johnston
et al., 2007), based on correct or error feedback (e.g., Rothe´
et al., 2011). Comparison of activity in lateral frontal and inferior
parietal cortex usually suggests strongly overlapping properties,
coding task-relevant information such as target location, stim-
ulus category, or working memory contents (Chafee and
Goldman-Rakic, 1998; Goodwin et al., 2012; Katsuki and Con-
stantinidis, 2012; Merchant et al., 2011; Swaminathan and
Freedman, 2012). Where similar information is represented in
frontal and parietal neurons, mean differences in latency are
again context specific (e.g., Buschman and Miller, 2007; Good-
win et al., 2012; Swaminathan and Freedman, 2012), usually
with strong overlap of latency distributions from the two regions.
These single-cell data make sense of the MD pattern seen in
fMRI. When cells adapt to code the specific information that is
required in current behavior, the result should indeed be aNeuron 80, October 2, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 39
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Figure 4. Adaptive Coding of Task-Relevant Information in Human
MD Regions
(A) Tasks from Woolgar et al. (2011a). Screen color indicated which of two
stimulus-response mapping rules linked stimulus position to the required
response. To manipulate perceptual demand, stimulus positions were widely
or narrowly spaced.
(B) Coding of rule, position, and response across MD regions, measured with
multivoxel pattern analysis. Ordinate shows discrimination of activity patterns
(success in classifying patterns in test data from patterns in separate train
data) for different task events (rule 1 versus rule 2; inner versus outer stimulus
positions; inner versus outer response positions; coding of stimulus and
response patterns as inner versus outer orthogonalizes rule, stimulus and
response classification, and means that chance performance for each
classifier is 50%). Asterisks above individual bars show comparison against
chance; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. IFS, inferior frontal sulcus; AI/FO, anterior insula/
frontal operculum; IPS, intraparietal sulcus; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex;
pre-SMA, presupplementary motor area. Adapted with permission from
Woolgar et al. (2011a).
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Reviewpattern of widespread activity, irrespective of particular task
content. In fMRI, information coding can be seen most directly
using multivoxel pattern analysis (Haynes and Rees, 2006). An
example (Woolgar et al., 2011a) is shown in Figure 4A. In this
study, screen background color instructed which of two stim-
ulus-response mapping rules should be used to link a visual
stimulus (a square in one of four positions along the horizontal
meridian) to a speeded keypress response (four keys, operated
by middle and index fingers of the two hands). To test the
hypothesis that coding would be sensitive to demand, stimulus
positions were either easy or difficult to distinguish. Across mul-
tiple MD regions, detailed patterns of activity in individual
subjects could be used to discriminate all relevant features of
the task—rule, stimulus position, and response position—
suggesting that coding of multiple task features was widespread
across the MD system (Figure 4B; see also Woolgar et al.,
2011b). In linewith the demand hypothesis, furthermore, position
coding was visible only in the more difficult condition (Figure 4B,
middle row). Using both MVPA and fMRI adaptation, multiple
studies converge to show widespread MD coding of relevant
stimulus features, rules, intentions, and responses (e.g., Haynes
et al., 2007; Li et al., 2007; Woolgar et al., 2011b; Thompson and
Duncan, 2009), with specific focus on currently attended infor-
mation (e.g., Hon et al., 2006; Li et al., 2009). MVPA studies
have also begun exploring the context specificity of MD coding.
Sometimes, for example, the pattern of activity associated with a
given task rule shows cross-generalization from one context to
another, suggesting a degree of common coding across some-
what different task states (Cole et al., 2011; Reverberi et al.,
2012).
Data from fMRI also support the prediction of strongMD activ-
ity when a new cognitive episode is created and in transitions
from one episode to the next. Strong MD activity is seen, for
example, at the boundary between perceived events, for
example at the transition between one movement and the next
in a piece of music (Sridharan et al., 2007, see Figure 5A; for a re-
view, see Kurby and Zacks, 2008). In any complex behavior,
goals (e.g., making breakfast) are generally achieved by means
of a hierarchically structured series of subgoals (make coffee,
tip in milk, etc.); a recent study shows extensive activity as
each subgoal is completed, with increasing activity for subgoals
progressively higher in the hierarchy (Farooqui et al., 2012;
Figure 5B). MD activity increases when materials for short-term
memory are formed into higher-level chunks, perhaps reflecting
activity as the parts of a newchunk are bound into onewhole (Bor
et al., 2003). Strong MD activity is associated with the major
change of cognitive context required in task switching (e.g.,
Dove et al., 2000; Wager et al., 2004). Electrophysiological data
also link task transitions to peaks of activity and synchrony in
frontal neurons (Fujii and Graybiel, 2003; Sakamoto et al., 2008).
Given differences in connections, cytoarchitecture, etc., it
seems certain that the anatomically distinct parts of the MD sys-
tem must have somewhat different physiological functions, and
the current literature contains several important proposals (e.g.,
Hampshire et al., 2012). Along the middle frontal gyrus, for
example, it is commonly suggested that there is some form of
anterior-posterior gradient, with more anterior regions involved
in higher-order or more abstract cognitive control (Badre and
Figure 5. Brain Activity Linked to Episode
Boundaries
(A) Activity at transitions between musical move-
ments. Adapted with permission from Sridharan
et al. (2007).
(B) Activity linked to goal-subgoal achievement.On
each trial, participants monitored a sequence of
letters (total sequence duration 52 s), searching
first for the three letters of a cue word (here CAT),
and finally for the letter X. Targets were to be de-
tected in the correct order, so that the participant
searchedfirst for T1 (hereC), thenafterT1hadbeen
detected, searched forT2 (hereA), etc.Detectionof
T3 thuscompleted thefirst subtask,whiledetection
of T4 (the letter X) completed the whole task. Plots
at the bottom show activity linked to target detec-
tion in MD regions (arbitrary units). Target-detec-
tion activity was widespread, often greater for T3
than for T1 or T2, and greatest for T4. For detection
of two successive two-letter words, strong activity
shifted from T3 to T2 (data not shown). L, left; R,
right; APFC, anterior prefrontal cortex; other
abbreviations are as in Figure 4. Adapted with
permission from Farooqui et al. (2012).
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and Duncan, 2012; Reynolds et al., 2012). As mentioned earlier,
resting state data suggest some division of the broadMD system
into separate lateral frontoparietal and cingulo-opercular sub-
networks, and it has been proposed that these focus respectively
on more phasic and more tonic aspects of task control (Dosen-
bach et al., 2006, 2007). The limbic connections of the dorsome-
dial frontal cortex suggest a link to reward processing, and it has
been suggested that this MD region is concerned in particular
with evaluating the costs and benefits of alternative plans of
action, and the effort needed for their implementation (e.g.,
Kolling et al., 2012; Shenhav et al., 2013). As the single-cell
data make clear, however, direct comparisons of neural proper-
ties in different MD regions generally suggest only subtle differ-Neuron 8ences, such as a difference of a few tens
of milliseconds in mean latency for
coding a particular type of task-relevant
information. This makes it unsurprising
that, at least as yet, the fMRI literature
contains little consensus on clear, repeat-
able functional distinctions. Typically, I
suggest, MD regions work together to
manage the sequence of attentional
episodes, with exchange of relevant infor-
mation on a timescale far too short to be
seen with fMRI. For this reason, fMRI
findings may generally be dominated by
coactivation, with dissociations at best
matters of degree.
Creating the Attentional Episode:
Configuring Brain-wide Processing
Activity
Of course, preferential coding of attended
information is seen in many regions of the
brain. Throughout the visual system, forexample, there is stronger response to attended than to ignored
visual inputs (Bushnell et al., 1981; Moran and Desimone, 1985;
Desimone and Duncan, 1995). A common proposal is that
frontoparietal cortex provides control input to many other
cortical and subcortical systems, biasing activity toward critical
or task-relevant information (Norman and Shallice, 1980; Miller
and Cohen, 2001; Dehaene et al., 1998; Desimone and Duncan,
1995). In line with such proposals, I suggest that MD activity
binds together the components of an attentional episode,
constructing the specific conjunction of processing events that
current behavior requires. Thus, brain-wide activity is configured
for solution of the current behavioral problem.
A potential mechanism is provided by a recent computational
model (Rigotti et al., 2010). In this model, an example processing0, October 2, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 41
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Reviewepisode might be, ‘‘If the task context is X and the stimulus is Y,
press button Z.’’ The model contains dedicated units for each
component of an episode—e.g., the context X, the stimulus Y,
and the response Z—alongwith a large pool of conjunction units,
randomly connected to the dedicated units. Because of the
random connections they send and receive, the conjunction
units are useful for stabilizing activity in any arbitrary combination
of dedicated units required in a current task epoch. The system
hasmost power when each randomly connected unit is bound to
approximately half of the dedicated units, reminiscent of wide-
spread inputs from multiple brain regions into frontal cortex
(Pandya and Yeterian, 1996) and rapid distribution of this infor-
mation between frontal regions (Pucak et al., 1996). Under these
circumstances, the randomly connected units show behavior
closely resembling activity of prefrontal cells, with dynamic,
selective coding of current task content and rapid changes in
properties from one task step to the next. Like the randomly con-
nected units of the model, neurons of lateral prefrontal cortex
commonly code conjunctions of events (Rigotti et al., 2013),
such as the combination of a particular task context and stimulus
category (e.g., Kusunoki et al., 2009) or rule and response (Asaad
et al., 2000; Tsujimoto et al., 2011).
The best-studied case of communication between frontal and
posterior cortical regions concerns control of extrastriate activity
by frontal eye fields (Moore and Armstrong, 2003; Armstrong
et al., 2006; Gregoriou et al., 2009). For example, electrical
microstimulation of the frontal eye field, targeted toward a local
region of the visual field, biases V4 processing in favor of stimuli
in that region (Armstrong et al., 2006). When attention is directed
to a stimulus in the visual field, LFPs show increased coherence
between frontal eye field and V4, with measures of Granger cau-
sality suggesting bidirectional causal influences (Gregoriou et al.,
2009). Though other evidence is patchier, a variety of results
show evidence for causal influences of MD regions on process-
ing elsewhere. Cooling lateral prefrontal cortex, for example, im-
pairs performance in a color-cued pro- and antisaccade task, at
the same time decreasing preparatory activity but increasing
visually driven activity in the superior colliculus (Koval et al.,
2011). In patients with lateral frontal damage, impaired target
detection in the contralateral hemifield is accompanied by re-
ductions in visual event-related potentials recorded over occip-
ital regions of the damaged hemisphere (Barcelo´ et al., 2000;
Voytek et al., 2010). Another potentially powerful approach is
to combine recording of evoked potentials with transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS); the widespread electrical activity
evoked by a frontal TMS pulse, for example, changes with task
context, suggesting an altered pattern of connectivity from fron-
tal to posterior brain regions (Sakai, 2013). When a cue instructs
subjects to store one of two objects (e.g., face and house) in
working memory, fMRI shows increased activity in visual regions
specialized for processing the selected object category (e.g.,
Higo et al., 2011). At the same time, the data suggest that func-
tional connections are established between the selected visual
region and frontal operculum/anterior insula, and with TMS
over operculum/insula, the effects of cues on posterior visual
activity are reduced (Higo et al., 2011). If subjects attend to color
and ignoremotion, then following error trials, activity in dorsome-
dial frontal cortex correlates with increased activity in color-42 Neuron 80, October 2, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.selective, but decreased activity in motion-selective, visual
regions (Danielmeier et al., 2011). Recent data suggest that, as
compared to other major brain systems, MD regions are excep-
tional in the degree to which they change functional connectivity
across changes in task (Cole et al., 2013). Preliminary though
they are, these data suggest a rich pattern of causal influences
between MD and other brain regions as attentional episodes
are established and executed.
TheMDSystem in Abstraction, Intelligence, and Control
A critical aspect of human cognition is the capacity for abstract,
symbolic thought. In line with the evidence previously reviewed
for prefrontal coding of abstract stimulus categories (Freedman
et al., 2001; Roy et al., 2010), the frontal lobes have often been
considered the seat of abstraction (Weigl, 1941; Goldstein and
Scheerer, 1941). Indeed, there is much in common between
the concepts of abstraction and attention. To define an abstrac-
tion, some common element must be isolated from multiple ex-
emplars. In other words, this common element is isolated from all
those accompanying and varying features that distinguish one
exemplar from another. On this line of reasoning, it makes sense
that a facility for selective attention to any arbitrary but isolated
aspect of some cognitive representation is also a facility for
abstraction. The facility is of course critical to rational thought,
where conclusions (e.g., conclusions in a trigonometric proof)
follow from focus on specific, selected aspects of a current situ-
ation (e.g., equality of two angles) and the exact implications of
these selected facts for others (e.g., congruence of two triangles)
(see e.g., Duncker, 1945; Simon, 1981).
In fMRI, the MD pattern implies cognitive functions of impor-
tance in many different kinds of activity. The existence of such
functions is strongly reminiscent of a core finding in psychomet-
rics, generally termed ‘‘positive manifold’’: for any battery of
cognitive tests, administered to a large and representative
sample of the normal population, the entire matrix of between-
task correlations will be positive, showing that, to some degree
at least, people performing well on one test tend also to perform
well on others (Spearman, 1904, 1927). For some kinds of mea-
sure, e.g., simple components of a highly familiar real-world skill
(Duncan et al., 1993), correlations can be close to zero; the gen-
eral principle of positive manifold, however, holds across an
extremely wide variety of laboratory and real-world activities. A
variety of explanations for positive manifold may be imagined
(e.g., Thomson, 1951; van der Maas et al., 2006). Indeed, it is
plausible that multiple factors contribute to positive correlations,
including genes with widespread influences on brain function,
mutual dependencies between lifetime experiences, etc.
According to the present analysis, however, one major factor
may be the role of MD regions in controlling all kinds of complex
behavior through a structure of attentional episodes. This
proposal of a common function in all kinds of behavior matches
Spearman’s own suggestion that some ‘‘general’’ or g factor
contributes to success in all manner of activities (Spearman,
1904).
In the context of Spearman’s theory, it is easy to determine
which tests are best correlated with (i.e., are the best
measures of) g (Spearman, 1904). Essentially, these are the tests
that show the strongest pattern of positive correlations with
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cess in other laboratory and real-world activities. The best mea-
sures of g are generally tests of novel problem solving, such as
series completions, analogies, and matrices (e.g., Raven et al.,
1988; Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, 1973),
commonly termed tests of ‘‘fluid intelligence.’’ On Spearman’s
account, such tests should provide an especially strong clue to
cognitive and brain functions underlying positive manifold and g.
A close link of fluid intelligence to MD function is strongly sup-
ported by functional imaging. A contrast of fluid intelligence tests
with sensorimotor controls shows a strong and selective pattern
of MD activity (Prabhakaran et al., 1997; Duncan et al., 2000;
Bishop et al., 2008). The literature on brain lesions is more com-
plex. For many years, indeed, it was accepted that frontal lobe
lesions, though leading to a widespread impairment of ‘‘execu-
tive’’ or control functions and an accompanying broad disorgani-
zation of behavior (Luria, 1966), were essentially unrelated to
psychometric ‘‘intelligence’’ (Hebb and Penfield, 1940; Teuber,
1972). The conclusion is paradoxical, since any functions of sig-
nificance across tests of many different kinds, providing they
show significant individual differences, should by definition
contribute to positive manifold and g. Outside neuropsychology,
indeed, broad control functions such as strategy optimization
have sometimes been proposed as a plausible basis for g (Mar-
shalek et al., 1983). In part, early conclusions from patient
studies may have reflected failure to draw the important distinc-
tion between fluid and crystallized intelligence (Cattell, 1971). In
contrast to novel problem solving, crystallized intelligence con-
cerns previously acquired knowledge such as vocabulary and
is often much less sensitive to brain damage (Cattell, 1971).
Tests of fluid intelligence, such as the Culture Fair, show espe-
cially strong deficits after frontal lobe lesions (Duncan et al.,
1995) but have often not been used in neuropsychological
work. In part, too, early conclusions may follow from relatively
crude comparisons, e.g., between ‘‘frontal’’ and ‘‘posterior’’
cortical lesions. Based on functional imaging results, fluid intelli-
gence deficits should be linked not to frontal or parietal lobe
lesions in general but to damage within the specific MD system.
The prediction is confirmed in recent work, with fluid intelligence
loss significantly predicted by volume of damage within but not
outside the MD system (Woolgar et al., 2010; see also Gla¨scher
et al., 2010).
In the normal population too, correlations of intelligence test
performance with anatomical measures, including cortical thick-
ness and local gray or white matter volume, most commonly
implicate frontal and parietal lobes (Jung and Haier, 2007),
though across studies, correlations have been reported for
many different cortical and subcortical regions (Jung and Haier,
2007; Deary et al., 2010). To interpret such data, it is important to
consider not just the correlation of behavior with anatomy in
individual brain regions or voxels but also the correlation in
anatomy between different regions (see Alexander-Bloch et al.,
2013). It is hard, for example, to interpret a performance correla-
tion with gray matter volume in any one voxel X, if volume in this
voxel is also correlated with volumes in a different region Y, and
questions of this sort require increased attention in future work.
Additional relevant data come from analysis of connectivity,
either ‘‘functional connectivity’’ (temporal correlations) in restingstate fMRI or white matter connectivity measured with diffusion
tensor imaging. Several results suggest that more efficient or
long-range connectivity is associated with higher intelligence
test performance (Li et al., 2009; van den Heuvel et al., 2009);
MD regions are among the most globally connected regions of
the brain (Cole et al., 2010b), and for lateral frontal cortex, the
strength of both positive and negative temporal correlations
covaries with fluid intelligence (Cole et al., 2012). Taken together,
the evidence from functional and structural imaging suggests
some link of g to MD function (Duncan, 1990; Kane and Engle,
2002) but with more to be done in integrating findings from
different sources.
In neuropsychology, many different tests have been designed
as measures of executive impairment after frontal lobe lesions.
Often, impairment is interpreted with close reference to specific
test content. In the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), for
example, the patient must learn to sort cards according to one
stimulus feature (e.g., color), then later switch to another (e.g.,
shape); commonly, deficits in frontal patients (Milner, 1963) are
ascribed to impaired switching of cognitive set. In verbal fluency,
the patient must generate as many words as possible from a
specified phonological or semantic category; often, the frontal
impairment (Benton, 1968) is interpreted as a failure in sponta-
neous generation of new search strategies. In general, however,
the convergent validity of such concepts has been disap-
pointing. The critical result would be, for example, that multiple
measures of set switching on the one hand, and of strategy
generation on the other, converge to define two coherent, disso-
ciable, and general kinds of executive deficit in frontal lobe
patients. Evidence of this sort is largely lacking (see e.g.,
Robinson et al., 2012; for some suggestive evidence from
studies of normal individual differences, see Miyake et al.,
2000; Friedman and Miyake, 2004).
By the principle of positive manifold, of course, all tests,
including any putative test of executive function, will be positively
correlated with fluid intelligence. Given deficits in fluid intelli-
gence following specific (MD) lesions within the frontal lobe,
one may ask how far this deficit alone explains impairment in
other neuropsychological tests. For some tests, indeed—
including such traditional executive tests as WCST and verbal
fluency—differences between patients and controls are largely
or entirely removed after correction for the difference in fluid
intelligence (Roca et al., 2010, 2012, 2013; for an additional,
specific influence of left posterolateral frontal damage in verbal
fluency, see Robinson et al., 2012). In such cases, it seems
unlikely that impairments should be interpreted in terms of spe-
cific test content, since the deficit measured is actually much
broader. Importantly, in contrast, other tests show deficits that
are not explained by fluid intelligence. Two such cases are tests
of social cognition/theory of mind (Stone et al., 1998) and tests of
open-ended planning in a complex, relatively real-world task
setting (Manly et al., 2002; see Shallice and Burgess, 1991). In
both cases, functional imaging data would suggest dominant
foci of frontal lobe activity well outside the MD system (Gilbert
et al., 2006) and, indeed, the most relevant lesions may be
much more anterior, around the frontal pole (Roca et al., 2010).
Plausibly, removing the common effect of fluid intelligence,
affecting results for tests of all kinds, may increase the clarityNeuron 80, October 2, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 43
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Full instructions
Reduced instructions Figure 6. Goal Neglect and Instructional
Complexity
(A) Stimulus sequence for a single trial in Duncan
et al. (2008). Two streams of symbols (asterisks,
letters and numbers; 400 ms/symbol) flashed up
simultaneously on a computer screen, one to the
left and one to the right of center.
(B) Mean goal neglect score for reduced- and full-
instructions participants binned by Culture Fair IQ.
A score of 0.5 indicates complete neglect of arrow
cues; 0 indicates perfect performance. Adapted
with permission from Duncan et al. (2008).
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outside the MD system, can then be identified. Meanwhile, it
seems likely that, in many conventional tests, impairments
largely or wholly reflect not specific executive functions, but
the global importance of the MD system in managing any struc-
tured behavior as a series of attentional episodes.
Attentional Episodes in Goal Neglect
A link of attentional episodes to fluid intelligence is also seen in a
striking form of performance failure I have called goal neglect
(Duncan et al., 1996). Goal neglect is manifest in a mismatch of
knowledge and behavior: the person understands and can
describe task requirements, but these requirements seem not
to control what is actually done. Goal neglect is well known in
patients withmajor frontal lobe damage (e.g., Luria, 1966;Milner,
1963). For example, the patient may be asked to squeeze the
hand when a light is seen; when the light is switched on, the
patient says ‘‘I must squeeze!’’ yet in fact does nothing (Luria,
1966). Even in the normal population, however, a similar goal
neglect can be seen when task requirements are complex.
Again, the participant understands task rules, and in principle
can obey them, but often a whole task is completed as if one
or more rules did not exist (Duncan et al., 1996). Asked at the
end of the experiment, neglecting participants report ‘‘not look-
ing out for’’ some critical triggering conditions for the neglected
rule, or seeing the relevant cues but ‘‘letting them go over my
head.’’ Critically, neglect is strongly correlated with fluid intelli-
gence—more strongly, for example, than several varieties of
working memory (Duncan et al., 2012). The result suggests sub-
stantial overlap between critical cognitive limits in goal neglect
and in standard fluid intelligence tests.
Task complexity is important in goal neglect and, critically, this
is not the complexity of actual performance. Instead, the critical44 Neuron 80, October 2, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.factor is complexity of initial task instruc-
tions. An experiment making this point
(Duncan et al., 2008) is illustrated in
Figure 6. On each trial (Figure 6A), two
streams of symbols (asterisks, letters,
and numbers) flashed up simultaneously
on a computer screen, one to the left
and one to the right of center. Rate in
each stream was 400 ms/symbol.
Streams were preceded by a verbal in-
struction to watch left or right, and on
the attended side, there were two tasksto carry out—repeating each letter aloud and adding each pair
of numbers. Near the end, a brief central arrow indicated the
side to attend for the remainder of the trial. For the trial in
Figure 6A, for example, a correct report would be ‘‘F, T, 5, B,
L,’’ though on other trials, the arrow would call for a switch of
sides. In tasks of this sort, it is the final side cue (here, an arrow)
that is often neglected. Most commonly, neglect takes the form
of completing all trials as though the final side cues did not exist,
though participants can repeat at the end of the task what these
cues required and, if alerted trial-by-trial to their errors, can
immediately begin to perform correctly (Duncan et al., 1996).
To examine the effects of complexity, the task can be simpli-
fied in various ways. One way is to instruct the participant, for
a whole block of trials, that no numbers (letters) will appear, so
that only the letter task (number task) need be borne in mind.
This has no effect on neglect of arrow cues; neglect is insensitive
to changing task complexity during actual performance. A
different way is to fix complexity at the time of performance
but now in the context of varied instructional complexity.
One group is given pure letter or pure number instructions
(Figure 6B, reduced instructions). The other (Figure 6B, full
instructions) is given both letter and number instructions, and a
single mixed practice trial, and then told that until further notice,
one type of trial (letter or number) will not appear. Though all data
are finally collected in pure letter or pure number trials, groups
differ substantially in the rate of arrow neglect (Figure 6B). These
data show a limit in use of complex task instructions to shape
correct behavior.
Why should such a complexity limit occur? Neglect suggests
that arrow cues do not trigger attention to the correct task
requirement, reminiscent of the general argument that complex
problems must be solved by appropriately focused attentional
episodes. In the case of goal neglect, task instructions define a
AB
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Figure 7. Attentional Episodes in Complex
Problem Solving
(A) Example matrix problem. The task is to decide
which of the four response options (bottom)
correctly completes the matrix (top). Complexity
derives from concurrent variation in multiple
stimulus features.
(B) Matrix problems with only a single varying
feature in each matrix. Each problem is one
component of the three-feature problem in (A) and
appears trivial in isolation.
(C) Embedded figures problem. The task is to find
the simple shape on top left hidden in the complex
image below. A solution can be found by focus on
successive parts of the target shape.
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task domain, and in correspondence to classic problems in
artificial intelligence (Figure 1), the selection of correct behavior
is increasingly challenging as overall problem complexity
increases. With low fluid intelligence, it may be hard to achieve
attentional focus on the correct part of a complex task space,
causing critical task rules to be ineffective in control of behavior.
A recent study by Bhandari and Duncan (2013) supports this
proposal. In this study, task requirements explicitly encouraged
division into two rather unrelated subtasks. For one subtask, for
example, stimuli might involve decisions about images of motor
vehicles (e.g., car or motorbike, driver or none), while for the
other, theremight be images of books. Independently, each sub-
task was simple (few requirements) or complex (more require-
ments). Instructions for both subtasks were given together
before performance began, followed by trials of the two subtasks
in randomorder. Thus requirements for both subtasks were to be
entered into memory before performance began; in this case,
however, the materials encouraged storage and use in distinct
cognitive chunks. As before, there were many cases of gross
performance failure (failure to use an instructed rule), analogous
to previous cases of goal neglect and again, strongly correlated
with fluid intelligence and not generally explained by explicitNeuron 8forgetting of task instructions. Again,
too, there were strong effects of task
complexity but now restricted by subtask
structure. For a given task requirement,
performance declined substantially with
increasing number of other rules within
the same subtask. Plausibly, these would
be the rules most difficult to exclude from
a current attentional episode. In contrast,
performance was independent of com-
plexity in the accompanying subtask.
There is a second important aspect to
the Bhandari and Duncan (2013) results.
In cases of gross neglect of some task
rule, we found that, most commonly,
some fixed pattern of behavior replaced
the correct rule. This fixed but incorrect
rule might take several forms: neglect of
a critical task event, a rule reversal, a
rule imported from another task, etc.Whatever it was, we found that the rate of using this fixed but
incorrect rule increased rapidly over the first few practice trials
and then stabilized; at the same time, usage of the correct rule,
though weak even on the first trial, showed a rapid decline.
The results suggest a critical difficulty in building the correct
structure of attentional episodes over the first few practice trials,
as knowledge from task instructions is first used to shape
behavior.
The need to divide complex activities into focused parts is
obvious in any complex activity and certainly in the problem-
solving tasks used to measure fluid intelligence. In Figure 7A,
for example, the problem may seem challenging if considered
as an undifferentiated whole; problems of this level of complexity
are frequently failed by people in the lower part of the fluid intel-
ligence distribution. It is trivial once effectively divided into
component subproblems, one focusing on color, one on shape,
and one on size (Figure 7B). A second example is the embedded
figures test, also strongly correlated with fluid intelligence
(McKenna, 1984). Here, the problem (Figure 7C) is to find a target
shape hidden in a camouflaging background. To find the target
shape as a whole is challenging, and participants who perform
poorly on this task may fail even after several minutes of search.
The target is easily found by breaking the problem into subparts,0, October 2, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 45
Neuron
Reviewe.g., a first search for the pointed tail, followed by search for an
attached vertical edge, and so on. This reasoning suggests that
the same limit in goal neglect—dividing a complex problem into a
focused series of attentional episodes—may also be critical in
standard fluid intelligence tests.
A variety of results links MD activity to task complexity,
including complexity of new task instructions. In matrix prob-
lems, for example, MD activity is strongly modulated by the
number of simultaneously varying stimulus attributes (Figure 7A
versus Figure 7B; see Christoff et al., 2001). During new task
instructions, there is phasic MD activity as new task rules are
defined (Cole et al., 2010a; Dumontheil et al., 2011; Hartstra
et al., 2011; Ruge and Wolfensteller, 2010), and as total task
complexity increases with addition of successive rules, there is
an accompanying increase in baseline MD activity (Dumontheil
et al., 2011).
The Bigger Picture
All complex behavior must be organized in a structure of atten-
tional episodes, dealing with one subproblem after another.
The MD system, I have argued, plays a critical role in dividing
complex problems into parts and hence in constructing compo-
nent episodes.
Separation into focused parts, however, is only one part of the
problem of complex behavior. A second challenge is to maintain
parts in the correct structural relations, as when multiple sub-
goals are subordinate to an overarching supergoal (Miller et al.,
1960), or when a line of reasoning is assembled from a structure
of component arguments. Certainly, for example, task perfor-
mance requires attentional episodes to be defined at different
levels of abstraction, e.g., selecting a response rule and then
applying this rule to a specific current stimulus (Badre and
D’Esposito, 2009). Problems of hierarchical organization and
structure have been extensively examined in symbolic artificial
intelligence (e.g., Newell, 1990). The brain needs mechanisms
not just for assembling attentional episodes but for maintaining
their structural relations (Dehaene and Changeux, 1997).
Similarly, MD function must be put in the context of other
systems contributing to behavioral organization. As noted
earlier, both functional imaging and lesion data suggest some-
what different functions for MD and frontopolar regions (e.g.,
Koechlin et al., 2003; Roca et al., 2010). Parts of frontopolar cor-
tex are incorporated within the well-known ‘‘default mode’’
network (e.g., Vincent et al., 2008; Power et al., 2011), whose
activity increases with broad changes of cognitive perspective
such as abandoning the present to recall a previous experience
or seeing a problem from another’s point of view (Buckner and
Carroll, 2007). Possibly, frontopolar activity is important in
setting large-scale cognitive context, with the MD system con-
structing distinct, more local attentional episodes within this
context (see also Sakai and Passingham, 2003; Cole et al.,
2010a). A further topic not addressed here is the link between
cortical and subcortical mechanisms of cognitive control, e.g.,
interacting control processes of frontal cortex and basal ganglia
(Alexander et al., 1986).
The immense diversity of human behavior, I have argued, calls
for principles that address how cognition in general is con-
structed and controlled. Consistent with activity during all kinds46 Neuron 80, October 2, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.of tasks, I suggest that the MD system builds basic constituents
for all complex cognition. In a series of attentional episodes,
brain-wide processing activity is configured to satisfy the
momentary, infinitely diverse requirements of complex thought
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